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10TH National Safety Seminar

Dear Pilots and Flying Enthusiasts.

You are cordially invited to attend the Gauteng Safety Seminar 2016.

PLEASE JOIN US FOR THIS INCREDIBLE EDUCATIONAL ROAD SHOW!!

Know your spots, Safety Campaign presentations on the state of Aviation in South Africa, Hazardous attitudes, Airspace infringements and lots more.

" Have you identified your hazardous attitudes? You may be unaware of a critical spot."

KNOW YOUR SPOTS, the joint Aero Club, CAA and GA industry safety campaign is our fourth event, and was well supported. So much so, it was imperative to bring you more...dynamic and focused on the content that you want!

Gauteng
Venue : Emperors Palace, Convention Centre
                Fabia Room
Date    : 17 November 2016
Time    : 08h00am for 08h30am

Please indicate dietary requirements.

We invite all pilots joining us in this events to complete a questionnaire regarding Hazardous Attitudes.
Kindly follow this link provided to complete the questionnaire :

https://www.enlightenpanel.com/survey/?ID=977

Please indicate your attendance to Kamfwab@caa.co.za / 071 600 9048.

Please join us once again.

 Safety Seminar Oct 16

62nd Air Safety Forum Report back - August 2016

pdfSafety_meeting_report_Aug_16.pdf362.66 KB

IFALPA Safety Bulletin - Brazilian Airspace

pdf16PRL06_IFALPA_on_Brazilian_airspace_safety.pdf209.14 KB

Airborne Image Recorders (AIRs) and Recording Systems

pdf15POS16_Airborne_Image_Recorders_AIRs_and_Recording_Systems_AIRS.pdf221.15 KB

M.Com Research Study 2015

 

Calling South African Airline Pilots to Participate in a M.Com Research Study

We are researching the Safety Culture of airline pilots in South Africa and would like you to participate in the study.

The questionnaire of this research was designed to study aspects of Safety Culture among pilots. The information you provide will help us, the research team, to better understand the quality of Safety Culture within the South African Commercial Aviation Industry. 

Because you are the one who can present us with a correct picture of how you experience Safety Culture, we hereby request your participation in this survey. Your response will be kept strictly confidential. Only members of the research team will have access to the information which you provide.

In order to participate in the survey, please click on the link:

http://goo.gl/forms/HxfT6JMJK8

Yours cordially,

Miss A Davids, M.Com Student (Intern Industrial Psychologist )

Mr K Heslop, Academic Supervisor (Industrial Psychologist )

Ms F Jakoet, Field Supervisor (Airline Pilot )

ICAO Accra FIR Meeting report

Thank you to Carl Bollweg for attending this meeting and submitting the following report..

pdf16ATS039_Report_Accra_FIR_Meeting.pdf186.91 KB

Accra Flight Information - update

(UPDATE) Safety of Civil Aircraft Operating in the Accra Flight Information Region (FIR)..

pdf15SAB015_-_update_-_Safety_of_Civil_Aircraft_Operating_in_the_Accra_FIR.pdf202.83 KB

IFALPA Safety Bulletin - Safety of Civil Aircraft Operating in the Accra Flight Information Region (FIR)

pdf15SAB015_-_Safety_of_Civil_Aircraft_Operating_in_the_Accra_FIR.pdf196.02 KB

 

German Wings Prelim Report - May 2015

pdfGerman_Wings_-_Prelim_Report.pdf2.05 MB

Statement DGPPN BVDN BVDP Flight 4U9525

The German Association for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics (DGPPN), Professional Association of German Specialists for Neurology and Psychiatry (BVDN) and Professional Association of German Specialists in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy (BVDP) are deeply shocked by the tragedy of the crash of Germanwings flight 4U9525.

Follow this link to read more..

pdfStatement_DGPPN_BVDN_BVDP_Flight_4U9525.pdf250.62 KB

IFALPA Press Release - Global Pilots: Germanwings Accident Investigation Fails to Meet International Standards

pdf15PRL14_-_Global_pilots_-_Germanwings_accident_investigation.pdf161.25 KB

EVAIR Safety Bulletin No 12 summer seasons 2008 - 2013

pdfEVAIR_bulletin12_2014_web.pdf3.25 MB

FRMS Seminar Presentations

Interesting articles from the FRMS Seminar which was held in March and were presented by Wynand Serfontein...

pdfFRMS_Policy_Doc_.pdf251.29 KB

pdfFRMS_-_Fatigue_Manual-_WS1-ALPA_MAR14.pdf284.34 KB

pptFRMS_-_ALPA_WS_WEB_-_Fatigue_Education_Module.ppt5.34 MB

 

 

 

Skybary Highights on Safety issues - 13 March 2014

SKYbrary Highlights

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Main_Page


Deep Stall

A Deep Stall, sometimes referred to as a Super Stall, is a particularly dangerous form of stall that results in a substantial reduction or loss of elevator authority making normal stall recovery actions ineffective. In many cases, an aircraft in a Deep Stall might be unrecoverable.

Learn more about Deep Stall.


Related articles


 

Deep Stall

CategoriesLoss of Control | Operational Issues | General Aviation

From SKYbrary Wiki

Jump to: navigationsearch

Article Information

Category:

Loss of Control

Content source:

SKYbrary

Content control:

EUROCONTROL

 

Contents

[hide]

*  1 Definition

*  2 Description

*  3 Related Articles

*  4 Further Reading

Definition

A Deep Stall, sometimes referred to as a Super Stall, is a particularly dangerous form of stall that results in a substantial reduction or loss of elevator authority making normal stall recovery actions ineffective. In many cases, an aircraft in a Deep Stall might be unrecoverable. This phenomenon affects certain aircraft designs, most notably those with a T-tail configuration.

Description

As the angle of attack of any aerofoil section is increased, the lift will also increase up to a point known as the critical angle. At this angle of attack (typically 15° to 20° for most aerofoil sections) the airflow separates from the upper surface of the wing and this condition is known as a stall. At the stall, lift is significantly reduced, drag is significantly increased and the airflow across, and behind, the wing becomes turbulent.

In an aircraft with a T-tail, the turbulent air in the wake of a stalled mainplane can affect the horizontal stabilizer, substantially reducing the effectiveness of the elevators and potentially negating the ability to recover from the stall by using pitch controls to reduce the mainplane angle of attack.

Deep Stall in a T-tail Aircraft

In the diagram above, the upper aircraft is in normal flight. The lower aircraft is in a stalled condition with a mainplane angle of attack in excess of the critical angle of attack. In the circumstance depicted in the diagram, the angle of attack is such horizontal stabilizers/elevators are in the turbulent airflow aft of the mainplane. This will substantially reduce the effectiveness of the horizontal stabilizer and elevators (and will also result in greatly reduced rudder authority)

Where the aircraft design includes gas turbine engines mounted on the fuselage either side of the tail, the same turbulent airflow affecting the tail surfaces can also affect the engines causing engine stall and surge, further increasing the danger of allowing such an aircraft to enter this Deep Stall condition.

Aircraft with a T-tail design are often configured with a Stick Pusher system to help prevent the mainplane angle of attack from reaching a value that could result in a Deep Stall.

Related Articles

*  Loss of Control

*  Stall

*  Stick Pusher

*  Unreliable Airspeed Indications

Further Reading

NTSB Safety Alerts on General Aviation risks

*  Safety Alert 19 - Prevent Aerodynamic Stalls at Low Altitude

EASA

*  EASA SIB 2013-02 - Stall and Stick Pusher Training

Retrieved from "http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Deep_Stall"

CategoriesLoss of Control | Operational Issues | General Aviation

NEWS

Airbus Commercial reports another year of financial improvement

In 2013, Airbus achieved a new industry record of 1,619 gross commercial orders (FY 2012: 914 gross orders) with net orders of 1,503 aircraft (FY 2012: 833 net orders), excluding ATR. Gross orders comprised 1,253 A320 Family aircraft, 77 A330s, 239 A350 XWBs and 50 A380s. Fourth-quarter orders included Emirates Airline’s agreement for 50 A380s and Etihad Airways’ order for 50 A350 XWBs, 36 A320neos and one A330-200F. Airbus Military (now part of Airbus Defence and Space) received 17 net orders (FY 2012: 32 net orders). Airbus’ net order intake increased sharply to €202.3bn (FY 2012: €88.9bn). At the end of 2013, Airbus’ consolidated order book was valued at €647.4bn (year-end 2012: €525.5bn). The Airbus Commercial backlog was worth €627.1bn (year-end 2012: €505.3bn), comprising 5,559 Airbus aircraft (year-end 2012: 4,682 units) and representing over eight years of production. Airbus Military’s order book was worth €20.8bn (year-end 2012: €21.1bn). Airbus series aircraft deliveries increased to 626 aircraft (FY 2012: 588 aircraft, including three A330s without revenue recognition). Airbus Military delivered 31 aircraft (FY 2012: 29 aircraft). Airbus’ consolidated revenues increased seven percent to €42,012m (FY 2012: €39,273m), reflecting higher commercial and military aircraft deliveries. The Division’s consolidated EBIT rose to €1,710m (FY 2012: €1,252m). Airbus Commercial’s revenues rose to €39,889m (FY 2012: €37,624m). The Airbus Commercial reported EBIT was €1,595m (FY 2012: €1,147m) with the EBIT before one-off at €2,216m (FY 2012: €1,669m). Airbus Commercial’s EBIT before one-off benefitted from the improved operational performance, including favourable volume, some better pricing and an improvement in A380 losses. It also included higher A350 XWB programme support costs. Revenues at Airbus Military rose to €2,893m (FY 2012: €2,131m), driven by the A400M ramp-up and higher volumes from both light and medium transport planes and tankers. The EBIT at Airbus Military was €166m (FY 2012: €93m).

This week’s AviTrader Headline News click here

This week’s edition looks at Air France-KLM’s move to invest in Brazilian low-cost carrier Gol as it looks to the Americas to reduce its dependence on the still-weak European market.

Also headlined this week:

  • US government warns of increased threat of shoe-bomb terrorism;
  • Bombardier loses top business jet spot to Gulfstream;
  • BAE Systems issues 2014 profit warning as US defines cuts bite;
  • Emirates rated Middle East’s most valuable brand – and world’s most valuable airline brand.

 

As always, you’ll also find all the latest headlines and breaking news stories from around the world in all sectors of the aviation industry, from aircraft, engines, MRO and production to finance, military, IT, appointments and more.

Just Released! AviTrader Monthly MRO e-Magazine click here

The global line maintenance outsourcing business is growing. With airlines continuously having to worry about costs and efficiency, how far have service providers gone to meet operator expectations? Our cover story looks at how line maintenance is driving the outsourcing trend.

 

ALPA: Pilot Shortage is All About the Money

Source: ALPA

27/02/2014

The Air Line Pilots Association Int’l (ALPA) today said that a pilot shortage will only exist if U.S. airlines fail to provide qualified pilots with career potential, adequate livable wages, and benefits. Although some within the airline industry blame the new pilot qualifications and training rules instituted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for a pilot shortage, the airline industry actually helped craft those rules and supported their passage.

“There is a shortage of pay and benefits for pilots in the regional airline industry, not a shortage of pilots who are capable and certified to fly the airlines’ equipment,” said Capt. Lee Moak, president of ALPA. “Congress, labor and the industry need to work together to create an airline industry that can offer jobs that are attractive to those who are interested in a career as an airline pilot.”

According to ALPA’s pay rate data, the average starting salary for new first officers in the regional airline industry is only $22,400, which compares very poorly with the starting salaries of other fields for which university aviation graduates are qualified to enter. These include: test engineer ($52,500); operations manager ($55,000); and, second lieutenant in the Air Force ($53,616 in salary and allowances).

ALPA will also ask Congress to review the federal government’s relationship with regional airlines that accept millions of dollars in government subsidies for providing Essential Air Service (EAS). These same airlines offer some of the worst wages and benefits in the industry and as a result, cannot fill their pilot seats. Great Lakes Airlines, which publicly complained recently about the “pilot shortage,” accepted tens of millions of dollars in EAS subsidies last year while paying its new-hire first officers $16,500 per year. Another carrier, Silver Airways, also accepted tens of millions of dollars in EAS funds while only paying its first-year pilots $20,770.

“Thousands of young adults learn to fly each year with the hopes of becoming airline pilots investing $150,000 or more for their college aviation education and flight training,” said Moak. “These future aviators need to see evidence that their investment will be rewarded otherwise, over the long-term, we will see a shortage of qualified workers in our aviation industry.”

 

6 Ways you can prepare to “age well”

You’re probably already doing a lot to ensure that you stay in good health and are able to enjoy your later years: eating right, exercising, getting checkups and screenings as recommended by your doctor. But it also makes sense to have some contingency plans for the bumps in the road that might occur.

  1. Adapt your home. Stairs, baths, and kitchens can present hazards for older people. Even if you don’t need to make changes now, do an annual safety review so you can make necessary updates if your needs change.
  2. Prevent falls. Falls are a big deal for older people — they often result in fractures that can lead to disability, further health problems, or even death. Safety precautions are important, but so are exercises that can improve balance and strength.
  3. Consider your housing options. You might consider investigating naturally occurring retirement communities (NORCs). These neighborhoods and housing complexes aren’t developed specifically to serve seniors — and, in fact, tend to host a mix of ages — but because they have plenty of coordinated care and support available, they are senior-friendly.
  4. Think ahead about how to get the help you may need. Meal preparation, transportation, home repair, housecleaning, and help with financial tasks such as paying bills might be hired out if you can afford it, or shared among friends and family. Elder services offered in your community might be another option.
  5. Plan for emergencies. Who would you call in an emergency? Is there someone who can check in on you regularly? What would you do if you fell and couldn’t reach the phone? Keep emergency numbers near each phone or on speed dial. Carry a cellphone (preferably with large buttons and a bright screen), or consider investing in some type of personal alarm system.
  6. Write advance care directives. Advance care directives, such as a living will, durable power of attorney for health care, or health care proxy, allow you to explain the type of medical care you want if you’re too sick, confused, or injured to voice your wishes. Every adult should have these documents.

Man “sits” pilot licence exam for friend

February 27 2014 at 11:01am 
By Staff Writer

Via IFALPA NEWS!

[Nigeria & South Africa! Why am I not surprised?]

Port Elizabeth - A man who wanted to get a commercial pilot licence was not sure he would pass the required exam, so he got his friend to write the exam for him, using forged documents.

The impostor passed the exam – but now faces four years in jail while his friend faces jail or a fine. Soponuchi Amadi from Nigeria and Nedsun Likhunya from Malawi both had private pilots’ licences and had gone to Port Elizabeth for further training. Amadi wanted a commercial licence, but was uncertain he would pass the exam. He asked Likhunya to write it for him. He gave him his private pilot’s licence and Likhunya altered it by replacing Amadi’s photograph with his own. Likhunya then wrote the exam posing as Amadi.

Invigilators were suspicious, and while the impostor was writing the examination with about 10 others, they set background checks in motion and found that he was not the man he said he was. Both men were charged under the civil aviation laws in the Port Elizabeth Magistrate’s Court and found guilty on several charges. Likhunya was sentenced to one year in jail on a charge of forgery and three years for contravening various civil aviation regulations. The court also ordered that his private pilot’s licence be cancelled.

Amadi, who had asked him to write the exam on his behalf, was found guilty of contravening several civil aviation regulations and sentenced to three years jail or a fine of R10 000. Two of the three years were suspended for five years. Poppy Khoza, director of the SA Civil Aviation Authority, welcomed the conviction and said the two men “seemed to be oblivious of the fact that in the aviation industry, there is absolutely no room for error” as this led to the loss of lives. Although Likhunya passed the exam, posing as Amadi, this would not have enabled Amadi to fly a commercial airline. Pilots need other requirements, such as an air transport pilot’s licence and many flying hours before they can take control of a commercial aircraft.

Wing Cracks to Delay 787 Deliveries

AINONLINE

by  GREGORY POLEK

Boeing recently raised 787 production to 10 airplanes a month. (Photo: Boeing)

March 7, 2014, 5:08 PM

Boeing 787 wing supplier Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has determined that a change in its manufacturing processes might have led to the development of hairline cracks in shear ties on Dreamliner wing ribs, Boeing confirmed Friday afternoon. The Chicago-based airframer said the problem could result in some delivery delays, but that the situation would not affect delivery guidance for 2014. Boeing recently increased production of the 787 to 10 airplanes a month.

The condition might appear in some 40 airplanes still in production, said Boeing. A company spokesman expressed confidence that the condition does not exist in any of the 787s now in service, however.

“We understand the issue, what must be done to correct it, and are completing inspections of potentially affected airplanes,” said Boeing in a statement. “We are addressing affected airplanes as required.” It added that the affected areas “are very small” and that the time required to address the problem would vary between one and two weeks per airplane.

  

Monday, March 10, 05:30 PM MYT +0800 Malaysia Airlines MH370 Flight Incident - 10th Media Statement

Source: Malaysia Airlines

10/03/2014

The purpose of this statement is to update on emergency response activities at Malaysia Airlines.

On notification of the incident the following steps have been taken:-

The EOC:-

1. Activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the early morning of 8 March 2014. The EOC is the central command and control facility responsible for carrying out emergency management functions at the strategic level during a disaster.

2. In addition to the EOC, various departments of Malaysia Airlines are also addressing to all the different needs during this crisis.

Family Management

1. Malaysia Airlines is working closely with the government of China to expedite the issuance of passports for the families intending to travel to Malaysia, as well as with the immigration of Malaysia on the issuance of their visas into Malaysia.

2. Malaysia Airlines is deploying an additional aircraft to bring the families from Beijing to Kuala Lumpur on 11 March 2014.

3. When the aircraft is located, a Response Coordination Centre (RCC) will be established within the vicinity to support the needs of the families. This has been communicated specifically to the families.

4. Once the Response Coordination Centre is operational, we will provide transport and accommodation to the designated areas for the family members.

5. Our oneworld partners have been engaged to help bring family members in other countries aside from China into Kuala Lumpur.

Search and Rescue

1. Malaysia Airlines has been actively cooperating with the search and rescue authorities coordinated by the Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia (DCA) and the Ministry of Transport

2. DCA has confirmed that search and rescue teams from Australia, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, New Zealand and the United States of America have come forward to assist. We are grateful for these efforts.

We also want to address a few common queries from the media.

We are receiving many queries about how the passengers with the stolen passports purchased their tickets. We are unable to comment on this matter as this is a security issue. We can however confirm that we have given all the flight details to the authorities for further investigation.

We also confirm that we are making necessary arrangements for MH370 passengers' families from Beijing to travel to Kuala Lumpur. However, flight details of the families’ arrival are highly confidential. This is to protect the privacy and well-being of the families during this difficult time and to respect their space. Our position is not to reveal any information on the flight or movements of the families.

Malaysia Airlines' primary focus at this point in time is to care for the families of the passengers and crew of MH370. This means providing them with timely information, travel facilities, accommodation, meals, medical and emotional support. The costs for these are all borne by Malaysia Airlines.

All other Malaysia Airlines’ flights are as per schedule. The safety of our passengers and crew has always been and will continue to be of utmost importance to us.

The airline continues to work with the authorities and we appreciate the help we are receiving from all local and international parties and agencies during this critical and difficult time.

Malaysia Airlines reiterates that it will continue to be transparent in communicating with the general public via the media on all matters affecting MH370.

The Aviation Herald

   
 

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Crash: Malaysia B772 over Gulf of Thailand on Mar 8th 2014, aircraft missing

By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Mar 8th 2014 01:10Z, last updated Monday, Mar 10th 2014 17:12Z

An Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200, registration 9M-MRO performing flight MH-370 from Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) to Beijing (China) with 227 passengers and 12 crew, was enroute at FL350 about 40 minutes into the flight about 90nm northeast of Kota Bharu (Malaysia) over the Gulf of Thailand in contact with Subang Center (Malaysia) just about to be handed off to Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Control Center (Vietnam) when radar and radio contact was lost at about 01:22L (17:22Z Mar 7th). Subang Air Traffic Control Center officially told the airline at around 02:40L (18:40Z Mar 7th) that the aircraft was missing. The aircraft would have run out of fuel by now, there have been no reports of the aircraft turning up on any airport in the region.

The airline confirmed on their website the aircraft is missing, a search and rescue operation has been initiated. Subang Air Traffic Control reported at 02:40 local Malaysian time, that radar and radio contact with the aircraft had been lost. The last radar position was N6.92 E103.58. There has been no distress call, no ELT or other signal was received from the aircraft. The focus is currently to locate the aircraft, as of 11:20Z Mar 8th search teams from Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam have failed to find any evidence of the aircraft. On Mar 9th 2014 14:43L (06:43Z) the airline added, that still no evidence of the aircraft has been found more than 24 hours after last contact with the aircraft and corrected the time of last contact with the aircraft to 1:30L. The airline stated, they are fearing for the worst, depending on where the aircraft will be found a command center will be set either at Khota Baru or Ho Chi Minh City.

In a press conference the airline stated, the last contact with the aircraft had been about 120 miles (90nm) northeast of Kota Bharu (Malaysia), over the Gulf of Thailand. The aircraft was piloted by an experienced captain (53, 18,365 hours total) and a first officer (27, 2,763 hours total). The aircraft carried 154 Chinese citizens, 38 Malaysians, 7 Indonesians, 6 Australians, 5 Indian, 4 French, 3 citizens of USA, 2 New Zealanders, 2 Ukrainians, 2 Canadians, 1 Russian, 1 Italian, 1 Dutch and 1 Austrian.

Search missions have been launched along the estimated flight track of the aircraft from Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos to China (South China Sea).

At about noon local time Vietnamese search personnel reported they have detected an ELT signal about 20nm south of the coast of Ca Mau. Vietnam officials subsequently stated that they have not yet detected flight MH-370.

In the afternoon local time an Admiral of the Vietnamese Navy was understood to indicate that the crash site of the aircraft has been located about 130nm south of the Vietnamese Island Tho Chau (110nm southwest of main land Ca Mau), the Navy later said that the admiral only referred to the position of last radio/radar contact with the aircraft, the aircraft has not yet been found.

China reported that the aircraft did not enter Chinese airspace (editorial note: which effectively discounts rumours and false reports by a Malaysian outlet of the aircraft having landed in Nanning (China)).

Nanning Airport stated the aircraft did not arrive at the airport.

The NTSB reported that a go-team has been dispatched to Asia to assist with the investigation into the missing flight MH-370. The NTSB wrote: "Once the location of the airplane is determined, International Civil Aviation Organization protocols will determine which country will lead the investigation."

In the evening of Mar 9th 2014 local time Malaysia's Transport Ministry reported, that no trace of the missing aircraft has been found at dawn Mar 9th after two days of search. The oil slicks as well as debris found so far are not related to the aircraft. Rumours like other crew establishing contact to the accident flight after radar contact was lost, phone contact to a mobile phone of one the passengers of the missing flight or the aircraft having landed in China or Vietnam, are false.

In the night of Mar 9th 2014 Vietnam's Search and Rescue Control Center released a photo of a part floating in the Gulf of Thailand, that despite darkness was discovered by a Twin Otter Aircraft of Vietnam's Coast Guard at position N8.792 E103.374 about 31nm southsouthwest of Tho Chu (editorial note: 114nm north of the last radar contact position) and is believed to be a part of the aircraft. The Control Center stated, the part is definitely made of composite material. Forces will be dispatched to the part after daybreak Mar 10th 2014. Malaysia's Department of Civil Aviation said later that this part is unrelated to MH-370, it was not recovered.

Hong Kong's Air Traffic Control Center reported on Mar 10th 2014 around 17:30L (09:30Z) that an airliner enroute on airway L642 reported via HF radio that they saw a large field of debris at position N9.72 E107.42 about 80nm southeast of Ho Chi Minh City, about 50nm off the south-eastern coast of Vietnam in the South China Sea and about 281nm northeast of the last known radar position. Ships have been dispatched to the reported debris field.

Vietnam's Headquarters for the Search and Rescue operation of MH-370 confirmed receiving the report by Hong Kong's Air Traffic Control Center stating that a Hong Kong based airliner reported a large field of debris while enroute on airway L642. A Thai cargo ship in the area was asked for assistance and has set course to the area but did not find anything unusual so far. A second vessel asked for assistance did find some debris. Following this finding Vietnam's Maritime Search and Rescue Services (MRCC) dispatched a ship to the debris field.

Hong Kong's Civil Aviation Department confirmed a Cathay Pacific flight from Hong Kong to Kuala Lumpur spotted large amount of debris while enroute off the coast of South East Vietnam.

According to The Aviation Herald's radar data the aircraft was last regularly seen at 17:22Z (01:22L) at position N6.9 E103.6 about half way between Kuala Lumpur and Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) at FL350 over the Gulf of Thailand about 260nm northnortheast of Kuala Lumpur and 90nm northeast of Kota Bharu 40 minutes into the flight, followed by anomalies in the radar data of the aircraft over the next minute (the anomalies may be related to the aircraft but could also be caused by the aircraft leaving the range of the receiver).

Aviation sources in China report that radar data suggest a steep and sudden descent of the aircraft, during which the track of the aircraft changed from 024 degrees to 333 degrees. The aircraft was estimated to contact Ho Chi Minh Control Center (Vietnam) at 01:20L, but contact was never established.

Italy's Foreign Ministry said, the Italian citizen is alive and was not on board of the aircraft other than the passenger manifest suggests, the man called his parents from Thailand. The foreign ministry later added, that the passport of the citizen had been recently stolen in Thailand.

Austria's Foreign Ministry stated in the afternoon (European time) that the Austrian listed on the passenger manifest was not on board of the aircraft. The foreign ministry later added, that the passport of the Austrian citizen had been stolen about two years ago when the citizen was touring through Thailand.

According to the states run Chinese news agency Xinhua Chinese police established that one of the Chinese passengers listed on the manifest never left China, is still at home and in possession of his passport, therefore was not on the accident flight. The passenger's passport had not been lost or stolen, the numbers on his passport and the passport number noted on the manifest are identical however.

Malaysia's Defense Ministry said, that as result of the verified discrepancies between passenger manifest and people on board of the aircraft, the Austrian and the Italian, the entire manifest is under scrutiny. At least 4 names are suspicious and are being investigated with the participation by the FBI from the USA.

China Southern Airlines, code share partner of Malaysia Airlines, reported that they sold a total of 7 tickets for the accident flight, amongst them the tickets for the Italian and the Austrian as well as one Dutch, one Malaysian, two Ukrainians and one Chinese.

The field of debris spotted from the air on Mar 10th 2014:


Part floating in Gulf of Thailand identified unrelated to MH-370 (Photo: Vietnamese Coast Guard):


Infrared VISSR Satellite Image Mar 7th 18:00Z (Graphics: AVH/Meteosat):


Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):

Symposium on Human Factors in Aviation

The First South African Symposium on Human Factors in Aviation took place in January.  The majority of the presentations have been uploaded in pdf format to a Dropbox site:

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/51bwd7g17i3qche/QfxY-AMPcC

Please feel free to access the presentations you are interested in from here. Obviously the work remains the property of the individual presenters and/or their organisations. There are a few that are outstanding because of confidential issues. I hope you will be kind enough to understand that some information might be sensitive.

 

Human Factors Symposium January 2014

Follow this link to read the presentation on Just Culture that was presented at the Human Factors Symposium which was hosted by ATNS at the end of January....

docxHF_Symposium_ATNS_-_January_2014.docx64.39 KB

 

AAP Meeting Report back November 2013

Report of IFALPA AAP Meeting held in Hong Kong 5-7 November 2013 Gavin McKellar and Cobus Toerien ALPA- SA

We attended the only AAP meeting of the year. It was well attended with 49 delegates and 40 papers we presented. Attendees included Boeing Airbus Hong Kong accident investigation department and ECA representatives.

Annex 19:

There is a new ICAO Annex 19.. It deals with safety management and what a state should do,,it includes inmportant aspects such a reporting and the attachment deals with guidelines for legal protection of safety data and processing systems. We were part of the meeting that formulated the IFALPA Annex 19. In here we express the views where pilots of the world (IFALPA) want more in the annex or don't agree with the annex. I think good work was done here. The committee accepted our work and this will now go to conference for acceptance as IFALPA policy..

Briefing Letter on non- punitive reporting Gavin wrote a paper on this for IFALPA. It was accepted by the committee after a few grammar and English language corrections were added. ICAO is to set up a working group on just culture ( a term they have stayed away from in the past). Gavin was elected by the committee to attend this group meeting and represent IFALPA if approved by out executive Board.

Statistics

The ICAO accident report for 2013 shows 2012 as the safest on record. The stat has dropped to 3.2 accidents per million departures.

IATA uses different criteria to determine their accidents and hull losses, but recently the two bodies have come to the logical decision of trying to combine their statistics. The Global Safety Index Exchange gives an accident rate of 2.4 per million departures. In 2012 there were 99 accidents with 372 fatalities.

Lack of Effective Implementation. (LEI)

ICAO measure, through their audits, how states are complying with the ICAO annexes and Standards. They have shown there is a direct correlation between LEI and the accident rate in a State.. It makes sense, ignore safety regulations and it will show up in accidents..accident investigation shows a 51% LEI. In the ICAO audits. Legislation shows up better as 79% LEI and organization as 65%. For me these are interesting. There is not one aspect in the audit that is better than 80%! As a pilot this surprises me.those that legislate our job cannot get above 80%, but we as pilots are mandated to. Pilots are left as the last line of defense all too often. ALL in the aviation system need a high level of risk management, regulations, legislation, organization, proficiency, CRM etc.  The UK CAA AAG did a study and it showed up, amongst ther things, that only 36% of accident reports were awarded a high level of confidence.

Contributing Factors:

We pushed this issue at IFALPA . We don't want accident reports to have a  section on causes and defiantally not probable cause as we still see in the NTSB. The Australian have a better system, facts, findings from the facts I chronological order, contributing factors, analysis and recommendations are included in an accident investigation. ICAO has taken some of our proposal and has included the option for States to use contributing factors instead of causes. Great. Partly there.

EU Regulations:

The EU is making some progress on the just culture and finding a common understanding. Their EU Regulation 996/20 is a new one for accident investigations in the EU.the pilots of ECA are part of an initiative by EUROCONTROL/ IFATCA to help train and province expertise to a technical investigation. This is an excellent initiative to bridge the gap between us and the legal Investigation guys and getting our pilot technical expertise and procedures known in legal circles.

Alliances:

Gavin is the safety representative to the Associacion of Star Air line pilots. This is the biggest alliance but there are One World and Sky Team as well. These alliances are mostly industrial and pilot conditions/ profession focused. There is an attempt to at least have a safety voice. Recently the alliances have been invited as formal member to the IFALPA Conference.In 2012 IFALPA adopted changes to their structure that allow for a formal role, both at Conference and a broad spectrum of Federation activities for the pilot Alliances. In 2013, for the first time ever, there were delegates at Conference representing alliances.  They can sent 6 delegates ( I am one for ASAP), they can attend all committees ( except admin and finance). They have a voice but cannot vote. My suggestion was to invite the alliance safety reps to the IFALPA AAP meetings. We usually try an get our pilot policy implemented through the State via ICAO. At other times we need to work at the airline level.. Having the alliance safety reps attend the AAP meeting as observers would have them get to know our policies and build relationships. It could lead to less duplication of effort and could be a way to get our pilot policy implemented at airlines through their safety office. The AAP committee agreed with my suggestion and we must now try and find contact persons and invite them

Accidents:

The committee discussed the recent accidents of our agenda. We are still waiting for some recent accident reports.

There have been a few recent low fuel incidents. It was interesting to learn that quite a few airlines manage that risk by mandating their aircraft have 1 hour of fuel on board at 1500 feet on landing. Sounds wonderful!  One airline said their management made the decision saying they want to sleep well at night.

Air France 447 - Feedback by Air France included the following:

1. They requested Airbus to look into the fact that the Flight Directors flashed on / off all the time during the descent, most probably adding to the confusion! Suggests that the FD remain off following this type of failure and only to be selected on by the crew, if required! [Children of Magenta?].

2. So too the "stall warning" to be continued even below 60 kts - in this event the on / off stall warning could also have been confusing!?

3. In addition, to have the angle of attack displayed whenever the aircraft approaches stall conditions.

4. AF is currently reviewing the "status" of First Officers [they do not have SFO's] due to the 'low esteem' and as a result the high cockpit gradient in AF cockpits! i.e the FO can now decide to land if PF and stable approach!

5. AF 'changed' their Head of Safety [after 3 major accidents] and they are re-engineering Safety throughout the whole company! [AF confirmed the large amount of ASR's received wrt pitot tube system failures].

After all this, still no resolve to the question - WHY did the crew fly into a 'mesoscale storm?'

Afriqiyah Airways in Tripoli:

1. Where it was initially believed [from the report] that the crew selected 'go-around flap' from F4 to F1, it was confirmed by Airbus that the crew did in fact select F3, then F2 and F1, but in all instances exceeding the flap limit speed [Vfe] as the aircraft accelerated to 260 kts when it hit the ground.

2. Fact remain that the crew also confused the go-around [selecting flap] versus EGPWS escape maneuver [AP off], thus negating the last defence mechanisms.

Lithium Battery Failures [I.e. UPS B747 accident]:

Apparently the transport of Lithium batteries to be 'removed' from Cargo aircraft, BUT we still carry Lithium batteries in Airline aircraft, i.e. cell-phones, laptops and Ipads [EFB's]!Lithium batteries still propose a fire hazard and these are again highlighted by the UPS B747 accident in Dubai in 2010. The issue will be dealt with by the DG committee but it should be noted airlines are doing training to minimize these incidents and results of them.

A few airlines have banned circling approaches and I would agree. RNP would be an alternative if you can. Airbus quoted figures such as if you can line up with the runway with your aids ( like a LOC or LNAV) it is 25 times safer, add a vertical profile ( such as VNAV/GS) and you times that by another 8 times. Go arounds from a circling is still an issue- rather ban circling approaches!

After  reviewing several accidents concerning circling to land approaches, their own serous incidents and their FDA data, CATHAY PACIFIC banned all circle to land approaches!

Most airlines do conduct circle to land approaches, so too SAA, and usually in mountainous terrain! It however remains dangerous!

Qantas A380 Singapore:

Exceptional event with 3 major engine pieces penetrating the a/c severing 600 wires [Airbus catered for one to fail in design]. Then - after all the warnings, how many more? FO lost his voice after reading 65 Ecam warnings! AP remained functional and could be used! Over weight a/c but LPC did not to accept so many failures for over weight landing procedure. Landing 165 kts and just made the RWY length, as calculated. Then Eng 1 did not shut down, what next? Evacuation to the right-hand side only due to engine & fuel leaks on the left, yet still people criticizing the crew for not evacuating quicker, ie on both sides! Significant damage to the left main spar and to date the most expensive a/c repair!

From a CRM perspective as well, the ECAM Warning priority was very good, but with minor problems such as 'wording' - ie Fuel Trim tank fuel not avail = not avail to ENG, but avail for trimming! [Airbus & RR did an intensive study and tried to rectify all issues as came to light!]. The Commander then decided to skip certain ECAM's realising the urgency of the situation, but did not disregard the ECAM failures / checklists, only prioritised to ensure a safe landing, then went back to complete what required completing! [Thinking outside the box when appropriate - well done!].

Asiana Airlines B777 San Francisco:

From an IFALPA point of view: Culture issues, even for the Korean ALPA rep to get to the crew in San Francisco - CIRP. Eventually got there and helped with translations wrt testimony's, media interviews, etc, but found it a daunting task as there was time to prepare or to get perspective. ALPA Rep & Crews exposed to the mass media in the hotel, which is ludicrous! However, excellent support eventually received from the US ALPA! [For info - NTSB will not interview crews without legal representation]. Accident investigation still in progress, thus sorry, no more detail as yet! NTSB 'Hearing' planned for 10 & 11 December wrt Automation & Emergency Response.

There continue to be accidents preceded by Deep landings. Crew need to be trained to land on the landing mat at if they land deep, they must be trained and mandated to go around. There have been a fair number of tail strikes during these go around maneuvers.

A  BIG risk is landing on not-dry runways!

The Air France at Toronto is a nice example of combining factors and how this can catch you by surprise!!

I think we still can...

-Teach pilots to always know where the touchdown is on the landing mat. How far in. If they do it every landing it will become habit -Perhaps on the airport briefing notices we could tell crew how deep the aiming point markers are. They differ. USA 300 m standard. ICAO 400 m standard.

-We could educate ALL crew using FDA data so that we all know how deep the landing mat markings and aiming points are, and we can see how deep we really are landing in reality. The data will show us.  Let's say in SELCAL. Pick 4 airports per mag. Tell crew from our own aims data what the average actual touchdown for our SAA different a/c types are and where the aiming point is.

-I think the Go Around  after touchdown training must be done  this could also help prevent tail strikes during aborted landings. We need training on these issues.  Some recent tail strikes during aborted landings;

5 Feb - Nippon 320 tail

12 Mar - Air India 319 tail

18 July - Sky airline 732.  Wingtip

Air France 447 - Feedback by Air France included the following:

1. They requested Airbus to look into the fact that the Flight Directors flashed on / off all the time during the descent, most probably adding to the confusion! Suggests that the FD remain off following this type of failure and only to be selected on by the crew, if required! [Children of Magenta?].

2. So too the "stall warning" to be continued even below 60 kts - in this event the on / off stall warning could also have been confusing!?

3. In addition, to have the angle of attack displayed whenever the aircraft approaches stall conditions.

4. AF is currently reviewing the "status" of First Officers [they do not have SFO's] due to the 'low esteem' and as a result the high cockpit gradient in AF cockpits! i.e the FO can now decide to land if
PF and stable approach!

5. AF 'changed' their Head of Safety [after 3 major accidents] and they are re-engineering Safety throughout the whole company! [AF confirmed the large amount of ASR's received wrt pitot tube system failures].

After all this, still no resolve to the question - WHY did the crew fly into a 'mesoscale storm?'

Afriqiyah Airways in Tripoli:

1. Where it was initially believed [from the report] that the crew selected 'go-around flap' from F4 to F1, it was confirmed by Airbus that the crew did in fact select F3, then F2 and F1, but in all instances exceeding the flap limit speed [Vfe] as the aircraft accelerated to 260 kts when it hit the ground.

2. Fact remain that the crew also confused the go-around [selecting flap] versus EGPWS escape manouver [AP off], thus negating the last defence mechanisms.

Lithium Battery Failures [I.e. UPS B747 accident Dubai]:

Apparently the transport of Lithium batteries to be 'removed' from Cargo aircraft, BUT we still carry Lithium batteries in Airline aircraft, i.e. cell-phones, laptops and Ipads [EFB's]!

[Note by Boeing on recent 3 x B787 LIT BATT failures: all the events on the ground with no pax. Also mentioned that the possibility of failure in flight remote, due to the batteries only being used on the ground!]

Qantas A380 Singapore:

Exceptional event with 3 major engine pieces penetrating the a/c severing 600 wires [Airbus catered for one to fail in design]. Then - after all the warnings, how many more? FO lost his voice after reading 65 Ecam warnings! AP remained functional and could be used! Over weight a/c but LPC did not to accept so many failures for over weight landing procedure. Landing 165 kts and just made the RWY length, as calculated. Then Eng 1 did not shut down, what next? Evacuation to the right-hand side only due to engine & fuel leaks on the left, yet still people criticizing the crew for not evacuating quicker, ie on both sides! Significant damage to the left main spar and to date the most expensive a/c repair!

From a CRM perspective as well, the ECAM Warning priority was very good, but with minor problems such as 'wording' - ie Fuel Trim tank fuel not avail = not avail to ENG, but avail for trimming! [Airbus & RR did an intensive study and tried to rectify all issues as came to light!]. The Commander then decided to skip certain ECAM's realising the urgency of the situation, but did not disregard the ECAM failures / checklists, only prioritised to ensure a safe landing, then went back to complete what required completing! [Thinking outside the box when appropriate - well done!].

Asiana Airlines B777 San Francisco:

From an IFALPA point of view: Culture issues, even for the Korean ALPA rep to get to the crew in San Francisco - CIRP. Eventually got there and helped with translations wrt testimony's, media interviews, etc, but found it a daunting task as there was time to prepare or to get perspective. ALPA Rep & Crews exposed to the mass media in the hotel, which is ludicrous! However, excellent support eventually received from the US ALPA! [For info - NTSB will not interview crews without legal representation]. Accident investigation still in progress, thus sorry, no more detail as yet! NTSB 'Hearing' planned for 10 & 11 December wrt Automation & Emergency Response.

Feedback from Boeing:

2013 - Already 7 major Boeing events [including 3 x B787 Lithium Batt failures - refer to in the above!] Lion Air B738 at Mali - a lot of confusion as to the sequence of events wrt CVR - ie Capt stating "I got it" - the a/c or the RWY?

B744 National Cargo Bagram Air Base: rotation after t/o into a stall and crashed! Strange way of securing vehicles in the back - as discovered by Boeing Investigators! No professional Load Masters awa a lot of other deficiencies - still under investigation. Interesting, there was already a load shift during the preceding flight, but with no check at Bagram! Also first time transporting this size of vehicles!

B777 Asiana at San Francisco: Crew almost made it - missed clearing the edge by 5 feet! Crew Culture - reluctance to hand-fly! Crew did try to go-around, but just too late - not enough speed due to lack in thrust! Sun behind the crew, thus not sure where the"glare" came from as mentioned! Also discussed, the lack in ICAO standard RT phraseology in the USA, and ATC keeoing a/c hot-and-high due to noise abatement! [Notam confirmed: - "No airlines to fly visual approaches into San Francisco!].

B738 LaGuardia South West RWY Excursion after 3g landing on nose-gear! CRM issues after an unplanned hand-over and incorrect flap setting for landing. Captain's service terminated!?

JUST CULTURE:

ICAO requested to amend various issues, ie to use 'Just Culture' instead of 'non-punitive,' etc! The importance of such a culture in accident / incident prevention also stressed throughout, and in addition, also to align with 'SMS wording!'

Eorocontrol have made up a nice set of cards one can use to facilitate discussions joust culture and safety. They can be found on www.bit.ly/safety ards

IFALPA Accredited Accident Investigators

Cobus Toerien and Gavin McKellar were re-accredited as IFALPA accident investigators there are sadly only 5 in Africa ( 2 in SA, 1 each in Namibia, Tunisia, and Morocco) and if you have the training and would like to be involved, please let ALPA know.

Chairman

 Juan Carlos will not stand for re-election as Chairman at conference and that position will be open for a new candidate

Next Meeting

This will be held in Dubai 14-16 October 2014

Safety Seminar Presentations

Please follow the links below to view the presentations from the ALPA-SA Safety Seminar which was held on the 16 October.

pdfPresentation_Mr_Peter_Mashaba_SAXPA.pdf495.36 KB

pdfGavin_Durr_-_Presentation_Safety_Seminar.pdf803.47 KB

pdfCobus_Toerien_Just_Culture_Presentation.pdf3.62 MB

 

 

 

 

Global Fatal Accident Review.

SKYbrary Highlights
  
 Global Fatal Accident   Review

The UK CAA has   published a study of worldwide fatal accidents to jet and turboprop   aeroplanes above 5,700kg engaged in passenger, cargo and ferry/positioning   flights for the ten-year period 2002 to 2011.

Learn more about Global Fatal Accident Review   2002-2011.

 

If you wish to contribute or participate in the discussions about articles you are invited to join SKYbrary as a registered user

Global Fatal Accident Review 2002-2011

From SKYbrary Wiki

Contents

1 Description

2 Worldwide   Fatal Accident Numbers

3 Worldwide   Aircraft Utilisation

4 Worldwide   Fatal Accident Rates

5 Factors and   Consequences

6 Related   Articles

7 Further   Reading

Description

The UK CAA maintains an ‘Accident Analysis Group’ (AAG) which has been in existence since 1996 when it was the origin of UK CAA CAP 681, a review of Global Fatal Accidents between 1980 and 1996.

The third Review of Global Fatal Accidents was recently published by UK CAA in CAP 1036 - Global Fatal Accident Review 2002 to 2011 which summarises a study of worldwide fatal accidents to jet and turboprop aeroplanes above 5,700kg engaged in passenger, cargo and ferry/positioning flights for the ten-year period 2002 to 2011. The style and content of the document are similar to the previous Global Fatal Accident Review (CAP 776) but there are, however, some differences and these are outlined in Appendix A (see Further Reading).

The main findings of the study are listed below.

Worldwide Fatal Accident Numbers

There were a total of 250 worldwide fatal accidents, which resulted in 7,148 fatalities to passengers and crewmembers onboard the aircraft. The proportion of aircraft occupants killed in these fatal accidents was 70%.

There was an overall decreasing trend in the number of fatal accidents, however there was much more fluctuation in the number of fatalities per year.

The approach, landing and go-around phases accounted for 47% of all fatal accidents and 46% of all onboard fatalities. Take-off and climb accounted for a further 31% of the fatal accidents and 28% of the onboard fatalities.

Worldwide Aircraft Utilisation

In the ten-year period 2002 to 2011, the number of flights flown increased by 22%, which equates to an average annual growth of 1.9%. The equivalent values for hours flown were 36% for overall growth and 3.0% for average annual growth.

Worldwide Fatal Accident Rates

The overall fatal accident rate for the ten-year period 2002 to 2011 was 0.6 fatal accidents per million flights flown, or 0.4 when expressed as per million hours flown.

There was a decreasing trend in both the overall rate of fatal accidents and onboard fatalities.

On average, the fatal accident rate for turboprops was four times that for jets, based on flights flown, and nine times greater when using hours flown as the rate measure.

On average, the fatal accident rate for aircraft with Maximum Take-Off Weight Authorised (MTWA) below 15 tonnes was three times that for aircraft with MTWA above 27 tonnes, based on flights flown, and nine times greater when using hours flown as the rate measure.

On average, the fatal accident rate for cargo flights was eight times greater than for passenger flights, based on flights flown, and seven times greater when using hours flown as the rate of measure.

The fatal accident rate for African operators was over seven times greater than that for all operators combined. North America had the lowest fatal accident rate of all the regions.

Factors and Consequences

Over half of all fatal accidents involved an airline related primary causal factor.

The most frequently identified primary causal factor was “Flight Crew Handling/Skill – Flight handling” which was allocated in 14% of all fatal accidents. “Flight Crew Handling/Skill – Flight handling” was also the joint most commonly assigned causal factor. This generally related to events in which the aircraft was controllable (including single engine failures on twin engine aircraft), however the flight crew’s mishandling of the aircraft or poor manual flying skills led to the catastrophic outcome.

66% of all fatal accidents involved at least one airline related causal factor. In addition to “Flight handling”, “Omission of action or inappropriate action” was the joint most commonly assigned causal factor.

“Omission of action or inappropriate action” generally related to flight crew continuing their descent below the decision height or minimum descent/safety heights without visual reference, failing to fly a missed approach or omitting to set the correct aircraft configuration for take-off.

38% of all fatal accidents involved at least one airworthiness related causal factor, of which “Engine failure/malfunction or loss of thrust” was the most common.

The most frequently allocated circumstantial factor was “Poor visibility or lack of external visual reference”. In the majority of cases this circumstantial factor was assigned, the accident occurred during a period of thick fog. The second most frequently assigned circumstantial factor “Weather general” mainly referred to accidents which occurred during heavy rain/snow, high winds or icing conditions.

Nearly 40% of all fatal accidents involved some kind of loss of control, making this the most frequent type of accident. Loss of control events were broken down into four categories – following technical failure, following non-technical failure, following icing, and following unknown reasons. Of these four, non-technical failures (for example flight crew failing to correctly respond to a warning) were the predominant cause of loss of control accidents.

Roughly half of all fatal accidents in which the pilot(s) lost control following a non-technical failure resulted in a post-crash fire, making this the most common post-crash fire precursor.

Over a third of all fatal accidents involved a post-crash fire; however this was always in conjunction with, or as a result of another consequence rather than in its own right. Fires in flight were far less common, accounting for 5% of all fatal accidents.

Mid-air collisions accounted for three out of the 250 fatal accidents (1%).

Asiana Airlines Flight 214

What Happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214?

Posted on July 7, 2013 by Steve

At about 11:28 a.m. PDT on July 6, Asiana Airlines flight 214 crashed at the approach end of runway 28L at San Francisco International Airport (KSFO). Less than 24 hours after the accident, it's way too early to know what happened, but there are some signs that the aircraft was not flying a stabilized approach at any part of the approach to land, and ended up low and slow just before impact.   Below, I outline the data that's available at this time, and why I think that's a possibility. But first, a disclaimer: There's not nearly enough data to determine the cause of the accident. The below is speculation, based on the data available to me, which is not even a few percent of the data that will be available to the NTSB. Most speculation this early in the process is wrong, precisely because so little data is available. So anything below that may appear to be stated as a fact is really a conjecture. First, the conditions at KSFO were ideal. The METAR 32 minutes before the accident was KSFO 061756Z 21006KT 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP097 T01780100 10183 20128 51005. That is, there was a 6 knot crosswind to runway 28L, with good visibility. The winds aloft were light, so wind shear doesn't appear to be a factor. Twenty seven minutes after the accident, the METAR was KSFO 061856Z 21007KT 170V240 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP098 T01830100. Still a light crosswind, but with more variable direction. However, given how light the winds were, this would not likely have had a big impact on the landing. So weather doesn't appear to be a factor. Indeed, the weather was near perfect at the time of the landing.

There are reports that the ILS glideslope was unavailable, but that the PAPI (precision approach path indicator) for runway 28L was functional. There are some conflicting reports that the PAPI was unavailable as well.  Aircraft were making visual approaches to 28L and 28R. Using radar data  from FlightAware, I plotted the altitude and airspeed of AAR214, as well as that of UAL852, another 777 which landed successfully only 10 minutes beforeAAR214. Both flights were long distance international flights (UAL852 originated at Heathrow, London), probably both full of people but without much fuel, so both aircraft would have had more or less the same weight on landing, and therefore the same reference approach speed, V                         ref . It's instructive to compare the landing profile of these two flights. The first plot below is the altitude vs. distance from the touchdown zone for both aircraft. UAL852 is in black, and AAR214 is in red.

On the other hand, AAR214 is 500 feet or so above the glideslope until about 4 nm out. At 3 nm out, the aircraft is quite high, on a 4.48 deg glideslope to the touchdown zone, or about 50% higher than it should have been. From that point, the aircraft descends rapidly, presumably to acquire the correct glideslope. At about 1.5 nm out, the aircraft crosses and then descends through the glideslope. At the last reliable radar return, the aircraft is at 100 feet, 100 feet below glideslope. Note, however, that the radar returns are quantized to 100 feet, so the result may not be very accurate. Nevertheless, you can see that the descent rate on short final is very high, perhaps twice what would be expected for a stabilized approach. It gets worse. The plot below is groundspeed for the two aircraft.

Because the winds are light and generally a crosswind, the speeds shown are probably within a few knots of the actual airspeed. Since we don't know the weights of the aircraft, we don't know what target approach speed (V ref ) was. However, you can see that starting about 6 nm from touchdown, UAL852 slows from about 190 knots to about 145 knots. A typical V ref for a 777 loaded with passengers but not much fuel is about 145 knots, so that makes a lot of sense. So UAL852 flew a stabilized approach, on the glideslope from 12 nm out, and slowing to V ref for full flaps about 3 nm (1 minute) out. On the other hand, AAR214 was never on a stabilized approach. Until about 30 sec before touchdown, it was high and fast. Only 3 miles out, it's 20 or 25 knots too fast, and 500 feet high. As a result, the pilot no doubt reduced power to intercept the glideslope from above. 1.5 nm out (nominally less than 40 sec from touchdown), he's finally on glideslope and at V ref , but with a high sink rate on low engine power. If he applied power at that point, the engines would take some time (a few seconds) to spool up, and he would further sink below glide slope, slow down, or both. The situation can be appreciated more precisely (but more technically) by looking at the total energy of the aircraft, that is, the sum of the potential energy due to altitude plus the kinetic energy due to velocity. The total energy is given by

E=mgh+1 2 mv 2

where m is the mass of the aircraft, g is the acceleration due to gravity, h is the height of the aircraft, and v is the velocity. Because we don't know the weight of the aircraft, it's convenient to normalize the energy by mg , yielding the energy height

h E =h+v 2 2g

Note that the energy of UAL852 decreases at a steady rate until about 6 nm out, where the rate of energy dissipation increases, because the aircraft is slowing. At about 3.5 nm out, the rate decreases, because the aircraft has hit its target approach speed and stops slowing down. AAR214 has a much different trajectory. At about 3 nm out, the rate of energy dissipation increases a lot, because the aircraft is both too high and too fast. As a result, the power is reduced significantly, perhaps even to near idle, in order to simultaneously slow the aircraft and get it down to the glideslope. At about 1.5 nm out, it has about the right airspeed and altitude (and therefore energy), but the energy continues to decrease precipitously. If the pilot added enough power at this point, a safe landing might have been possible. But it takes several seconds for the engines to spool up, and the pilot may not have added enough power or done so early enough, so both the altitude and airspeed continue to decrease below their desired values. Indeed, at the last radar return, AAR214 would have been near its stall speed, and unable to pull up. These data are entirely consistent with the eyewitness observations, which indicate that the aircraft approached steeply, and then tried to pull up when it got too low, but was unable to. It's also consistent with observations that the engines were powering up just before impact. Whatever the reason the pilot flew this approach profile, it's clear that he never had the aircraft established on a stablized approach. FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-71 states that:

An approach is stabilized when all of the following criteria are maintained from 1000 feet HAT [height above touchdown] (or 500 feet HAT in VMC) to landing in the touchdown zone:

The airplane is on the correct track. 

The airplane is in the proper landing configuration. 

After glide path intercept, or after the FAF, or after the derived fly-off point (per Jeppesen) the pilot flying requires no more than normal bracketing corrections2 to maintain the correct track and desired profile (3° descent angle, nominal) to landing within the touchdown zone. Level-off below 1000 feet HAT is not recommended.

The airplane speed is within the acceptable range specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot.

The rate of descent is no greater than 1000 fpm. If an unexpected, sustained rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm is encountered during the approach, a missed approach should be performed ...

Power setting is appropriate for the landing configuration selected, and is within the permissible power range for approach specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot.

It appears that there is no point in the approach where the approach is stabilized. Indeed, the rate of descent at 600 ft was 1320 ft/min, well above the allowable descent rate. Standard procedure at most airlines would have required the aircraft to go around at that point. However, it's not clear that standard practice conforms to standard procedure, and  pilots may be reluctant to initiate a go-around at a busy international airport on a clear day. One other important factor may be that the glideslope signal of the instrument landing system (ILS) was out of service at the time of the accident. It's standard practice to use the ILS glideslope even when on a visual approach. Indeed, FAR 91.129 (e)(2) requires that, "Each pilot operating a large or turbine-powered airplane approaching to land on a runway served by an instrument approach procedure with vertical guidance, if the airplane is so equipped, must: (i) Operate that airplane at an altitude at or above the glide path between the published final approach fix and the decision altitude (DA), or decision height (DH), as applicable." Normally pilots would use the ILS glideslope for this purpose. They could have used GPS for vertical guidance (there is an RNAV (GPS) PRM RWY 28L approach), but may not have done so. It's far too early to know the cause of the crash of Asiana Airlines flight 214. However, early indications are that it might be due to an unstabilized approach, which is a leading cause of approach and landing accidents. If the cause does turn out to be an unstabilized approach, it will be relatively straightforward for the NTSB to make that determination. The data recorder and cockpit voice recorder will have ample data to determine what decisions the crew made on final approach, what the state of the aircraft was throughout the approach, and what control inputs were applied.

 UPDATE:

At about 4:45 EDT today, the NTSB held a press conference, and it appears most of our conjecture is correct. The target approach speed was 137 kt (not 145). Just before impact, the power was indeed at idle, and the airspeed dropped "significantly below 137 knots and we're not talking about a few knots." Seven seconds before impact, a pilot called for increased power. At 4 seconds before impact, the stick shaker actuated, indicating incipient stall. At 1.5 seconds, a pilot called for a go-around, much too late, obviously. So it appears (so far) that our analysis is more or less correct.

Here is a link to the KML file for those who may want to visualize more of the flight path.

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

CBS News

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57592723/ntsb-s.f-jet-was-far-below-target-speed-before-crash/  

NTSB: S.F. jet was far below target speed before crash

National Transportation Safety Board chairwoman Deborah Hersman said the flight data recorder from Flight 214 indicates the pilots disengaged the autopilot 82 seconds prior to the impact.

SAN FRANCISCO The Asiana Airlines plane that crashed at San Francisco International Airport was traveling at just 106 knots at impact - well short of the 137-knot target speed, federal investigators said on Monday. National Transportation Safety Board chairwoman Deborah Hersman said the flight data recorder from Flight 214 indicates the pilots disengaged the autopilot 82 seconds prior to the impact. She said that three seconds prior to the crash, Asiana Flight 214 recorded its lowest speed of 103 knots and at impact, the plane's airspeed only reached 106 knots - well below the aircraft's target landing speed of 137 knots, or 157 mph.

Asiana Airlines: Pilot was getting on-the-job-training / Asiana Airlines Flight 214 tried to abort landing

Survivor: Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crew seemed surprised by crash. Despite at least one report that the 777 experienced a rapid descent rate prior to impact, Hersman said the radar data indicated that there was "no abnormally steep descent." Hersman also said part of the tail section of the Asiana jetliner was found in the waters of San Francisco Bay, and debris from the seawall was carried several hundred feet down the runway, a federal official said Monday. The lower portion of the plane's tail cone, she also said, was found in rocks inside the seawall. A "significant piece" of the tail of the aircraft was in the water, and other plane parts were visible at low tide.

The plane's location above the San Francisco Bay raises some red flags. CBS News correspondent John Blackstone reported that a normal descent on Runway 28 Left requires an angle that keeps jets well above the waters, but 16 seconds before the crash, the jet was 200 feet above the bay.

In a window seat just behind the wing, passenger Benjamin Levy said started to worry. "I don't see runway, I just see water," Levy recalled. "So I'm realizing we're way too low, but I'm like, 'oh, he's going to make it, he knows what he's doing, right?'"  Investigators have reviewed airport surveillance video to determine whether an emergency vehicle ran over one of two teenage girls killed in Saturday's crash, Hersman told reporters, but have not been able to reach any conclusions. She called the possibility that a girl was run over a "very serious issue." "I can tell you that the two fatalities were located in seats towards the rear of the aircraft. This is an area of the aircraft that was structurally significantly damaged. It's an area where we're seeing a lot of the critical or serious injuries," Hersman said of the girls' location. Investigators want to make sure they have all the facts before reaching any conclusions, Hersman said, adding that the coroner has not yet determined the girl's cause of death and is charged with doing so.

CBS

San Mateo County Coroner Robert Foucrault earlier said his office was conducting an autopsy to determine whether one of the victims survived the crash but was run over and killed by a responding vehicle. He said his staff was notified of the possibility by senior San Francisco Fire Department officials at the crash site on Saturday.

San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White and Assistant Deputy Chief Dale Carnes both said earlier Monday that one of the two teenage girls killed in the crash might have been struck. "There was a possibility one of two fatalities might have been contacted by one of our apparatus at one point during the incident," Carnes said.

More than 180 people went to hospitals with injuries. But remarkably, 305 of 307 passengers and crew survived the crash and more than a third didn't even require hospitalization. Only a small number were critically injured. Investigators said the crew tried to abort the landing just before it smashed onto the runway. What they don't yet know is whether the pilot's inexperience with the Boeing 777 and at San Francisco's airport played a role. Officials said the probe will also focus on whether the airport or plane's equipment also could have malfunctioned. One of the issues NTSB investigators are certain to give a hard look is what role pilot fatigue played in the accident. The accident occurred after a 10-hour nighttime flight. As is typical for long flights, there were four pilots on board precisely so that they can switch off in teams of two to get rest. But pilots who are regularly fly long routes say it's very difficult to get restful sleep on planes.

CBS News aviation and safety analyst Mark Rosenker, a former NTSB chairman, said on "CBS This Morning" that investigators had already made "significant progress" because they have the cockpit recorders, eyewitnesses and they can talk to both crew members and pilots in the vicinity who had a front row seat to the crash landing.

"But there's a long way to go before they can really understand exactly what happened, why it happened and then make recommendations to prevent it from happening again," Rosenker said. CBS News aviation and safety analyst Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger said the investigation could take 18 months. "They're writing a nonfiction detective story that may be 900 pages," Sullenberger said on "CBS This Morning." Investigators said the weather was unusually fair for foggy San Francisco. The winds were mild, too. During the descent, with their throttles set to idle, the pilots never discussed having any problems with the plane or its positioning until it was too late.

Firefighters said they encountered smoke, leaking jet fuel and passengers coming down on chutes when they arrived. Lt. Christine Emmons said Monday at the news conference that she and her partner ran up a chute into the plane and found four passengers trapped in the back. The conditions in the plane were changing rapidly, with the fire coming down on rescuers and the smoke thickening as the trapped passengers were pulled out to safety, she said. Seconds before the Boeing 777 struck down, a member of the flight crew made a call to increase the jet's lagging speed, Hersman said Sunday. Then came a warning that the plane was about to stall and cockpit communication that the crew wanted to abort the landing and go back up for another try, she said. The airline said Monday in Seoul that the pilot at the controls had little experience flying that type of plane and was landing one for the first time at that airport. Asiana spokeswoman Lee Hyomin said that Lee Gang-guk, who was at the controls, had nearly 10,000 hours flying other planes but only 43 in the 777, a plane she said he still was getting used to flying. Another pilot on the flight, Lee Jeong-min, had about 12,390 hours of flying experience, including 3,220 hours on the 777, according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in South Korea. Lee was the deputy pilot, tasked with helping Lee Gang-guk get accustomed to the 777, according to Asiana Airlines. However, Sullenberger cautioned that the total number of hours flying may not be a factor. He pointed out that his first officer on the "Miracle on the Hudson" flight, Jeff Skiles, had never flown an Airbus before the flight - but he had extensive training and had captained many other airplanes. "Everybody's new on an airplane at some point (in their career)," Sullenberger said. Two other pilots were aboard, with teams rotating at the controls. There was no indication in the discussions between the pilots and the air traffic controllers that there were problems with the aircraft. Survivors and rescuers said it was nothing less than astonishing that nearly everyone survived after a frightful scene of fire burning inside the fuselage, pieces of the aircraft scattered across the runway and people fleeing for their lives.

In the first comments on the crash by a crew member, cabin manager Lee Yoon-hye said that seconds before impact she felt that something was wrong. "Right before touchdown, I felt like the plane was trying to take off. I was thinking 'what's happening?' and then I felt a bang," Lee told reporters Sunday night in San Francisco. "That bang felt harder than a normal landing. It was a very big shock. Afterward, there was another shock and the plane swayed to the right and to the left." She said that during the evacuation, two inflatable slides that were supposed to inflate toward the outside instead inflated toward the inside of the plane, hurting two Asiana flight attendants. Pilots came to rescue the flight attendants but even after getting injured, she said that the crew did not leave the plane until after the passengers evacuated. She said she was the last one to go. South Korea's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport said the 291 passengers included 141 Chinese, 77 South Koreans, 64 Americans, three Canadians, three Indians, one Japanese, one Vietnamese and one person from France.

The two dead passengers have been identified as students from China - 16 and 17 years old - who were scheduled to attend summer camp in California with dozens of classmates. Hospital officials said Sunday that two of the people who remained hospitalized in critical condition were paralyzed with spinal injuries, while another two showed "road rash" injuries consistent with being dragged. Foucrault, the coroner, said one of the bodies was found on the tarmac near where the plane's tail broke off when it slammed into the runway. The other was found on the left side of the plane about 30 feet (10 meters) away from where the jetliner came to rest after it skidded down the runway. The flight originated in Shanghai, China, and stopped over in Seoul, South Korea, before making the nearly 11-hour trip to San Francisco.

When the plane hit the ground, oxygen masks dropped down, said Xu Da, a product manager at an Internet company in Hangzhou, China, who was sitting with his wife and teenage son near the back of the plane. He stood up and saw sparking - perhaps from exposed electrical wires - and a gaping hole through the back of the plane where its galley was torn away along with the tail. Xu and his family escaped through the opening. Once on the tarmac, they watched the plane catch fire, and firefighters hose it down. In the chaotic moments after the landing, when baggage was tumbling from the overhead bins onto passengers and people all around her were screaming, Wen Zhang grabbed her 4-year-old son, who hit the seat in front of him and broke his leg. Spotting a hole at the back of the jumbo jet where the bathroom had been, she carried her boy to safety. "I had no time to be scared," she said. Nearby, people who escaped were dousing themselves with water from the bay, possibly to cool burn injuries, authorities said. By the time the flames were out, much of the top of the fuselage had burned away. The tail section was gone, with pieces of it scattered across the beginning of the runway. One engine was gone, and the other was no longer on the wing. © 2013 CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. The Associated Press contributed to this report.

SAN FRANCISCO — Firefighters encountered smoke, leaking jet fuel and passengers coming down on chutes when they arrived at the Asiana jet crash at San Francisco International Airport that killed two people and injured more than 180. Lt. Christine Emmons said Monday at a news conference that she and her partner ran up a chute into the plane after Saturday’s crash of the Boeing 777 and found four passengers trapped in the back. The conditions in the plane were changing rapidly, with the fire coming down on rescuers and the smoke thickening as the trapped passengers were pulled out to safety, she said. Investigators have determined that Asiana Airlines Flight 214 was traveling “significantly below” the target speed during its approach and that the crew tried to abort the landing just before it smashed onto the runway. What they don’t yet know is whether the pilot’s inexperience with the type of aircraft and at San Francisco’s airport played a role.

Officials said Sunday the probe was also focusing on whether the airport or plane’s equipment also could have malfunctioned. The South Korea government announced Monday that officials will inspect engines and landing equipment on all Boeing 777 planes owned by Asiana and Korean Air, the national carrier. Also Sunday, San Mateo County Coroner Robert Foucrault said he was investigating whether one of the two teenage passengers killed actually survived the crash but was run over by a rescue vehicle rushing to aid victims fleeing the burning aircraft. Remarkably, 305 of 307 passengers and crew survived the crash and more than a third didn’t even require hospitalization. Only a small number were critically injured. Investigators said that the weather was unusually fair for foggy San Francisco. The winds were mild, too. During the descent, with their throttles set to idle, the pilots never discussed having any problems with the plane or its positioning until it was too late. Seven seconds before the Boeing 777 struck down, a member of the flight crew made a call to increase the jet’s lagging speed, National Transportation Safety Board chief Deborah Hersman said at a briefing based on the plane’s cockpit and flight data recorders. Three seconds later came a warning that the plane was about to stall. Two-and-a-half seconds later, the crew attempted to abort the landing and go back up for another try. The air traffic controller guiding the plane heard the crash that followed almost instantly, Hersman said.

Info on Go Arounds

Good info and drill-downs on GO-AROUND issues..

http://goo.gl/HgaKB

IFALPA Position Paper - Smoke and Fumes

Please follow this link to read the latest position paper from IFALPA..

pdf14POS04_-_Smoke_and_fumes.pdf392.55 KB

Wing Tip Clearance

How well can You judge wing tip clearance?

On 18 June 2010 a B737 taxiing for a full length daylight departure from was in

collision with an A321 which was waiting on a link taxiway leading to an intermediate

take off position on the same runway. The aircraft sustained damage to their right

winglet and left horizontal stabiliser respectively and both needed subsequent repair

before being released to service. (Source IFALPA)

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/B738/A321,_Prague_Czech_Republic,_2010_%28GND_HF%29

B-737 LION AIR HIT SHORT OF RWY

B-737 LION AIR HIT SHORT OF RWY WHEN LANDING @ BALI INDONESIA , APR 2013

Bali plane crash pilots criticised! Lion Air needs safety measures, proper training: Bali crash report Indonesia's National Transport Safety Committee (NTSC) says budget airline Lion Air should immediately introduce a number of safety measures when it comes to landing procedures. It also says the airline must ensure its pilots are properly trained,  after a preliminary investigation into last month's Boeing 737 crash in Bali.  All 108 passengers and crew survived when the passenger jet undershot  the tourist island's main airport runway and landed in the water.

The preliminary report says a young, second-in-command pilot was at the controls at a "critical time". 

While the report did not give an exact cause of the crash, it ruled out any major problems with the new Boeing 737-800 passenger jet. Weather reports indicated that there was a sudden loss of visibility in the area, it said, adding the second-in-command pilot was in charge seconds before the plane crashed into the sea just before the runway. The 24-year-old, who had 1,200 hours of flying experience, was in control during the descent into the airport and reported that he could not see the runway 900 feet above ground. The captain then switched off the auto-pilot and the second-in-command handed over controls to him at around 45 metres - or one minute and six seconds before the crash after repeating that he could not see the runway. 

One second before the crash, the pilot commanded a "go-around" and attempted to abort the landing, but it was too late. [WAY TOO LATE !]

The preliminary report recommended Lion Air "review the policy and procedures regarding the risk associated with changeover of control at  critical altitudes or critical time".  [Not good enough - what about Minima & Go-around fr not visual?]. It added the fast-growing airline should also "ensure the pilots are properly trained during the initial and recurrent training program with regard to changeover of control at critical altitudes and or critical time". A spokesman for Lion Air, which has had six landing accidents in the past decade, said on Wednesday the airline had not "received the report yet".

The cause of the crash has potential implications for the reputation of Lion Air  - one of the world's fastest-growing airlines - which is fighting to be removed from a European Union safety blacklist, even as it buys record volumes of Airbus and Boeing jets. Indonesia has also failed UN agency the International Civil Aviation Organisation's standards for aircraft operations and maintenance, and as a result American regulators have imposed restrictions on them starting or increasing flights to the United States. The NTSC said it expected to release its final report within the next 12 months.

 

Mali Incident

MALI: Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013, landed short of runway and came to stop in sea [Aviation Herald]

The Aviation Herald

A Lionair Boeing 737-800, registration PK-LKS performing flight JT-904 from Bandung to Denpasar (Indonesia) with 101 passengers and 7 crew, was on approach to Denpasar's runway 09 at about 15:10L (07:10Z), but came to a stop in the sea short of the runway, the aircraft broke up in two parts....

Click on this link to read more...pdfMali_Incident_Apr_13.pdf851.2 KB

 

SAX Accident Report - Interesting reading from 2010

Interesting Reading:  http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/DH8C,_Kimberley_South_Africa,_2010_(RE_BS)

 

Runway Excursions - Interesting Reading

Safety statistics show that runway excursions are the most common type of accident reported annually, in theEuropean region and worldwide.

Causal and contributory factors that may lead to a runway excursion are identified by analysing data of runwayexcursions that occurred during the period 1980-2008. The scope of this report includes runway excursions that have taken place globally......

Follow this link to read the full article.

pdfRWY_Excursions.pdf1.05 MB

Singapore Report A380

REPORT: Singapore Airlines A380 near Singapore on Jan 31st 2011, burned wires in forward cargo hold..........

See this link for the full report pdfReport_Singapore_A380.pdf12.57 KB

Hand signals

Dear Member

Recently, a serious incident occured overseas due to a delay in reporting a fire in an aircraft’s engine on a movement area. Hand signals are an important medium to communicate when no direct communication is possible and it is important that we as aircrew to understand these without delay.

Please take note of IFALPA's latest AGE Briefing Leaflet regarding Aerodome Emergency  Hand Signals. 

To access your copy, please see the link below:

pdfIFALPA_Briefing_Leaflet_-_Aerodome_Emergency_Hand_Signals.pdf526.03 KB

 

Regards

ALPA SA Technical Team

Air France Accident Report

“Air France Flight 447 was a scheduled commercial flight from Rio de Janeiro -Galeão (GIG) to Paris -Roissy (CDG) on an Airbus A330-200 aircraft that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean on 1 June 2009, killing all 216 passengers and 12 aircrew. The accident was the deadliest in the history of Air France, and has also been described as the worst accident in French aviation history.”

Please see this link for the full report..

pdfAIR_FRANCE_447.pdf569.91 KB

Cockpit interuptions and distractions

Please see the following link to read the study done on Cockpit Interruptions and distractions;

pdfCockpit_Interuptions_and_distractions_Study.pdf79.69 KB

IFALPA AAP Meeting May 2012

Cobus Toerien, Gavin Mc Kellar and Fatima Jakoet attended the IFALPA AAP meeting held in May in Warsaw. Fatima has compiled the following report. Thank you Fatima.

pdfAAP_IFALPA_Committee_Meeting_-_May_2012.pdf129.6 KB

Accident report presented at the AAP Meeting

This attached accident report was presented at the recent AAP meeting and is interesting reading.

pdfOY-CRG_eng_3.pdf6.11 MB

Contact Us

Head Office:
A: 10 Blockhouse Street Kempton Park 1619

Contact Us:
Tel.  (011) 394-5310

alpasa@mweb.co.za

ALPA-SA: Emergency number:

27 82 826 5007

or 27 11 394 5310

MAYDAY Helpline

+27-12-333-6000

Ask for "MAYDAY"

support@mayday-sa.org.za

www.mayday-sa.org.za

IFALPA Emergency number: 
+44 (0) 1202 653 110 (24hrs)

 

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